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Beating the Odds: The Public Policy of Drug 
Efficacy and Safety  
Noah Lewellen* 
Your scientist friend just inherited a fortune and is looking 
to invest. Illiterate in finances and distrusting of bankers, he 
decides to test local psychics to see which is skilled enough to 
be entrusted with his investments. Being a scientist, he de-
signed a test to determine the statistical significance of a psy-
chic’s predictions: he flips a coin 200 times and asks the psychic 
to call the flip. By random chance, the psychic should be right 
about fifty percent of the time, or on about 100 flips.1 One psy-
chic he found, however, was able to predict the coin toss on 114 
flips, which, using a chi-square test, gives a p-value of 0.0477.2 
That means, your friend expounds excitedly, that he can be 95 
percent confident that the psychic was using some ability—not 
random chance—to predict the flip.3 He immediately delivers 
his fortune into the care of the psychic’s financial wisdom.  
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
University of Chicago. Thank you to Professor Fred Morrison for his advice 
and guidance. Thank you also to my colleagues, the board and staff of Minne-
sota Law Review, for the great work they did to publish this Note. Finally, 
thank you to my parents, Phil and Linda, for their constant support and love, 
even when I ignored their wishes to become an engineer or a pastor and ap-
plied to law school. Copyright © 2015 by Noah Lewellen. 
 1. Kelly H. Zou et al., Revisiting the P-value: A Comparison of Statistical 
Evidence in Clinical and Legal Medical Decision Making, 8 L. PROBABILITY & 
RISK 159, 160 (2009). 
 2. This value is obtained by performing a chi-square test,  
χ2 = Σ (observed value minus expected value)2 / (expected value), after deter-
mining the degrees of freedom in the experiment—in this case, 1—and apply-
ing the resulting χ2 value to a chi-square distribution table. For a brief 
walkthrough on how to perform a chi-square test, including a chi-square dis-
tribution table, see Phillip McClean, The Chi-Square Test, N.D. ST. U. (2000), 
http://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~mcclean/plsc431/mendel/mendel4.htm. 
 3. A p-value of 0.0477 indicates that one would expect a random guess 
for each flip to result in 114 accurate “calls” out of 200 total to occur in roughly 
4.77% of such trials (i.e., 0.0477*100). See Zou et al., supra note 1, at 160. 
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Even once you understand the significance of the p-value 
result, it is easy to criticize your friend’s decision. Aside from 
the questionable transfer of skills at predicting coin flips to 
predicting the stock market, his test suggests that the psychic 
will be wrong roughly forty-three percent of the time.4 Even if 
this misallocation of money never results in a loss—an unlikely 
proposition—the fact that the investment resulted in no posi-
tive benefits means that your friend has missed opportunities 
to gain money forty-three percent of the time.   
If this seems nonsensical, it may be surprising to learn 
that the p-value test is a critical benchmark for drug approval 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in their efficacy 
testing for drugs that treat anything from the common cold to 
breast cancer.5 In the last couple of years, however, the use of 
p-values in proving causation between drugs and their effects 
has come under close scrutiny: the Supreme Court held in 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano6 that statistical signifi-
cance, through p-value analysis, is not determinative in finding 
causation between a drug and its side effects.7 In a recent 
Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Harkonen,8 the court 
implied that p-values were determinative in linking a drug to 
its positive benefits.9 These decisions are ostensibly in conflict 
and thus cast doubt on the ubiquitous use of p-values as critical 
benchmarks for drug approval and statistical significance in 
the FDA’s drug approval process.  
Part I of this Note sets forth the FDA’s current drug ap-
proval process, including its regulations and guidelines regard-
ing p-values and statistical significance, and provides examples 
of both approvals and rejections of drug applications. Part II 
examines the tension between Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano and United States v. Harkonen and analyzes how 
the FDA’s drug approval process has affected courts’ decisions. 
Part III contends that Matrixx and Harkonen can be reconciled 
 
 4. (86/200)*100 = 43% chance of being wrong. 
 5. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE 
OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 12 (1998), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm078749.pdf (noting approval of a drug 
based on a single study with a low p-value). 
 6. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
 7. See id. at 1319 (noting that other factors, not just a p-value, are con-
sidered when determining causation).  
 8. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 9. See id. at 637–38; infra Part I.C. 
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by framing statistical significance in the overall structure of 
the FDA’s approval process regarding drug safety and efficacy. 
This framework can be extended to cover new areas of food and 
drug law, including the burgeoning field of personalized medi-
cine, by proposing a balancing between statistical significance 
and other important factors facing consumers. This Note con-
cludes that statistical significance, while highly relevant in the 
traditional efficacy context, is not as useful in examining the 
safe use of drugs in uniquely-populated fields like personalized 
medicine; it then details how courts might flexibly analyze such 
situations using the FDA’s guidance and policy considerations 
tacitly outlined in Harkonen and Matrixx.   
I.  HISTORY AND MODERN LANDSCAPE OF STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE   
The importance of statistical significance in the FDA’s de-
cision-making processes must be placed in the context of its 
historical and current purpose of protecting consumers. Section 
A will briefly discuss the historical purpose of the FDA and the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Section B will 
provide a background on the FDCA’s requirements regarding 
drug safety and efficacy. Sections C and D introduce Harkonen 
and Matrixx, respectively, and provide background on how the-
se cases seem to challenge the FDA’s current approach in using 
statistical significance in safety and efficacy. 
A. PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY OF THE FDA 
The FDA was initially concerned solely with the safety of 
drugs, not their effectiveness.10 The priorities of the FDA were 
mostly based on ensuring uniformity in the production of 
drugs.11 However, weak statutory language allowed numerous 
ineffective or harmful drugs to come to market.12 This changed 
with the 1962 amendments to the FDCA, which forced manu-
facturers to prove both the safety and effectiveness of their 
products to the FDA for its approval.13 The FDA currently 
claims responsibility “for protecting the public health by assur-
ing the safety, efficacy and security of human . . . drugs [and] 
 
 10. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm 
(last updated Mar. 11, 2014). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
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for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations 
that make medicines more effective, safer, and more afforda-
ble.”14 
B. ACT REQUIREMENTS AND APPROVAL PROCESS 
The FDCA requires drug manufacturers to show, through 
“substantial evidence,” both the safety and efficacy of their pro-
posed drugs.15 The standard of evidence used is only vaguely 
defined as  
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . 
by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could 
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will 
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the condi-
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.16 
In meeting this standard, manufacturers generally perform at 
least two large-scale, controlled clinical trials to demonstrate 
the safety and efficacy of the drug.17 These studies must follow 
a variety of guidelines promulgated in FDA regulations gener-
ally establishing what an “adequate and well-controlled study” 
entails.18 
 
 14. What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo (last up-
dated Aug. 5, 2014). 
 15. FDA, supra note 5, at 2–3; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (stating 
that the Secretary shall not approve a drug if there is a lack of substantial ev-
idence proving efficacy or safety).  
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). One notable exception to the vagueness of the ap-
proval or denial process is the strict Delaney Clause, which declares that no 
additive may be deemed safe if it is found to cause cancer in humans or exper-
imental animals. Janssen, supra note 10. While it is outside the scope of this 
Note to discuss the Delaney Clause, it is worth noting that the Clause has 
been rather liberally interpreted by the FDA to allow additives which cause 
cancer in some circumstances, such as if those additives cause cancer only in 
doses which no human would be likely to ever consume. See Richard A. Mer-
rill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congression-
al Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG., 
Winter 1988, at 6–7. 
 17. Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in 
the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 23, 27 (2012). The statute 
also recognizes that sometimes one study, rather than two, may be acceptable 
in showing substantial evidence. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This is, however, disfa-
vored by the FDA for a variety of reasons, including the higher risk of false 
positives. FDA, supra note 5, at 4–5. Of the single studies that qualify, the 
FDA notes that they should be, among other things, “particularly persuasive 
(low p-value).” Id. at 12. 
 18. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2014) (stating that studies, among other 
items, should use a design that allows for comparison and that the method of 
assigning patients to control groups should minimize bias).   
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After submission of a manufacturer’s studies, reviewers 
undertake analyses of those studies in order to make a recom-
mendation to approve or deny the new drug application.19 In a 
reviewer’s analysis of efficacy claims made in a manufacturer’s 
clinical study, nearly every aspect of the claim is reviewed with 
statistical significance, in the form of a p-value, as a key de-
termining factor.20 The p-value is used extensively to uncover 
study flaws based on, among other factors, study group compo-
sition.21 A finding that a study lacks the statistical significance 
to show effectiveness, especially in conjunction with a finding 
that serious adverse effects have been implicated, generally re-
sults in an application denial.22 
C. EFFECTIVENESS AND HARKONEN 
Beyond study design, however, there are few hard-and-fast 
rules as to what may constitute substantial evidence of effec-
tiveness. The Act does not define “effectiveness,” and the Third 
Circuit upheld the FDA’s interpretation that “statistical signifi-
cance” is insufficient without substantial evidence of “therapeu-
tic effect.”23 Some authors have claimed that the FDA employs 
 
 19. See generally FDA, supra note 5 (providing guidance to the industry 
on how to design a study to show clinical effectiveness for an effective NDA). 
 20. See, e.g., YUAN WHO CHEN, FDA, SBLA 103780/5010, STATISTICAL 
REVIEW 8–12 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/ucm106184.pdf. 
 21. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(4). This process is important be-
cause the FDA recognizes that studies are generally designed by manufactur-
ers to achieve positive results. See FDA, supra note 5, at 4 (noting biases can 
lead to false conclusions). Analyses such as these keep manufacturers from 
hiding study manipulation behind acceptable efficacy ratings. See Malani et 
al., supra note 17, at 25 (discussing how the FDA wishes to avoid manipula-
tive data mining by drug companies). 
 22. See, e.g., ERIC BASTINGS, FDA, CLINICAL/CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 
AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW FOR NDA 20-626, SE5-004 (2004), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
DevelopmentResources/UCM163202.pdf. 
 23. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1986). In 
making this decision, the court cited several studies regarding Chymoral, the 
drug in question. Id. One study relied on what the FDA found to be inappro-
priate post hoc stratification to show statistical significance. Id. It is important 
to note, as the court did, that the Commissioner stated that “the most reliable 
test of effectiveness is the comparison of the total drug group to the total pla-
cebo group.” Id. This test relies on statistical analysis and indicates that the 
application may have been successful had there been a substantial effect 
shown by unbiased statistical analysis. The second study the court discussed, 
however, declared that, despite well-founded statistical significance in effect, 
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other standards, such as an amorphic “clinical significance” for 
prescription drugs.24 However, it is largely undisputed that the 
FDA requires statistical significance to establish the basis of 
scientific claims.25 Statistical significance at the very least pro-
vides some indication of effect,26 which is perhaps why the FDA 
requires it as an indicator for drug approval. Lack of statistical 
significance in a study comparing a drug to a control, however, 
does not affirmatively indicate that there is no difference be-
tween the treatment and control.27 For example, in a study that 
requires a p-value of 0.05 to find statistical significance, an 
empirical finding of a p-value of 0.055 will not indicate said 
significance, even though it is highly likely that the study 
reached the result due to an effect outside of random chance.28 
Despite the fact that the lack of statistical significance does 
not automatically indicate a lack of efficacy in drug studies, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Harkonen29 indi-
cates that a lack of statistical significance in a drug study is 
enough to prohibit a manufacturer from advertising its drugs 
as effective.30 In that case, Harkonen, a physician, researcher, 
and former CEO of InterMune, Inc., was convicted of wire fraud 
for issuing a press release touting the effectiveness of a new 
 
the achieved effect was “therapeutically trivial,” and therefore ineffective for 
its intended use. Id. at 156.  
 24. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Note, The Usage and Meaning of “Clinical 
Significance” in Drug-Related Litigation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553, 568 
(2002) (noting that FDA approval cases are not clear about how to define sig-
nificance). 
 25. Id. at 591. 
 26. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 14, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) 
(No. 09-1156) [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (“[S]tatistical significance provides some 
indication about the validity of a correlation between a product and [an effect] 
. . . .”).  
 27. See Brief of Amici Curiae Statistics Experts Professors Deirdre N. 
McCloskey and Stephen T. Ziliak in Support of Respondents at 7–8, Matrixx, 
131 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 09-1156) [hereinafter Brief for Statistics Experts] 
(“[F]ailing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that one should then 
accept it.”). 
 28. Cf. id. at 8 (discussing how failing to reject the null hypothesis does 
not automatically indicate a certain lack of causality). When one fails to reject 
the null hypothesis, despite the existence of causation, this is known as a Type 
II error, or a false negative. Id. at 9. This Note primarily discusses Type II er-
rors. 
 29. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 30. See id. at 637–38 (holding that evidence was sufficient to find a state-
ment of efficacy misleading). 
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prescription medication, Actimmune.31 The press release re-
ported the preliminary results of a standard clinical trial which 
showed that patients with idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis were 
40 percent more likely to survive if taking Actimmune instead 
of a placebo.32 Despite this appearance of effectiveness, the re-
sults were not statistically significant with regard to the 
study’s pre-set endpoint: at 0.084, the p-value exceeded 0.05.33 
In its prosecution of Harkonen, the government contended that 
the study merely suggested a survival benefit, but failed to af-
firmatively demonstrate one.34  
Harkonen’s press release contained such headlines as 
“InterMune Announces Phase III Data Demonstrating Survival 
Benefit of Actimmune in IPF,”35 and “Reduces Mortality by 70% 
in Patients with Mild to Moderate Disease.”36 These announce-
ments were made after two members of the FDA’s medical re-
view staff—not acting for the Agency—informed Harkonen that 
the data were inconclusive and insufficient for FDA approval to 
treat IPF; they indicated further studies would be required.37 
Moreover, the p-value for the primary endpoint of the study 
was 0.5.38 The government argued that the lack of statistical 
significance for this preset endpoint meant that no one could 
draw any conclusions from the trial and that any claim that 
Actimmune had any survival benefit was “just false.”39 
In affirming Harkonen’s conviction of wire fraud, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that such a conviction does not require a showing 
that the defendant’s representations are universally considered 
 
 31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–2, Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 13–180). 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. Id. at 2, 5. 
 34. Id. at 2. It is interesting to note that the set endpoint of the clinical 
trials discussed in Harkonen was not based purely on survival, but on “an ap-
proximately ten percent improvement in survival without progression in dis-
ease severity.” Id. at 5. The results for this endpoint were not statistically sig-
nificant. Id. 
 35. IPF stands for idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a progressive lung dis-
ease. See What Is Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & 
BLOOD INST. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/ 
topics/ipf. 
 36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 7. 
 37. Id. at 8, 10. 
 38. Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. at 10. For comparison, a p-value of 0.5034 in a coin-flipping exper-
iment measuring the frequency of heads and tails for bias is generally consid-
ered to indicate a non-significant result and an unbiased coin. Zou et al., supra 
note 1, at 160. 
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false.40 The district court noted that a number of witnesses tes-
tified that the data demonstrated a survival benefit.41 In dis-
missing the relevance of this testimony, the court stated that it 
could not acquit someone of fraud simply because other experts 
in the field would have made similar misrepresentations given 
the set of data presented.42 At the same time, the district court 
found that a “‘p-value of 0.05 [was] somewhat of a magic num-
ber,’” and that results that report a p-value above it “‘are gen-
erally considered unreliable and [thus] not statistically signifi-
cant.’”43 
The government’s position in Harkonen was a stark change 
from its stance in an amicus brief in Matrixx urging the Su-
preme Court to reject the theory that statistical significance de-
termines scientific truth.44 In fact, the Matrixx court agreed 
with the government in that instance, contrasting the Ninth 
Circuit’s findings in Harkonen.45 
D. SAFETY AND MATRIXX 
Despite safety being held to the same substantial evidence 
standard as efficacy by statute,46 in practice, the FDA has ap-
plied this standard much differently. Even the indication—even 
if not statistically significant—of adverse effects may have a 
bearing on a new drug application’s (NDA) denial.47 Adverse ef-
fects may manifest long after the conclusion of a clinical trial, 
and statisticians have persuasively argued that statistical sig-
nificance is an incomplete and anemic standard for determining 
 
 40. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2013). In 
fact, the court cited case law to show that fraud encompassed a variety of be-
havior, including any “‘dishonest method[] or scheme[],’ and any ‘trick, deceit, 
chicane, or overreaching.’” Id. at 637 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 
U.S. 19, 27 (1987)). The court noted that the fraudulent nature of a defend-
ant’s actions is measured by a non-technical standard. Id. (citing United 
States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)).   
 41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 11.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (quoting United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010 
WL 2985257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010)). The court apparently reached 
this conclusion at the behest of other experts. See Harkonen, 2010 WL 
2985257, at *5. 
 44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 3. 
 45. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321–23 
(2011) (holding that reports can be material despite lack of statistical signifi-
cance). 
 46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 47. See, e.g., BASTINGS, supra note 22, at 3. 
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the relevancy of adverse effects.48 Indeed, the FDA’s own guid-
ance documents reflect the understanding that the clinical tests 
required for efficacy and safety testing generally lack the power 
required to fully explore all potential adverse effects.49 This, 
too, was the Solicitor General’s position in an amicus brief filed 
in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.50  
Instead, the FDA endorses a more holistic approach, adopt-
ing factors such as association strength, temporal relationships 
between adverse events and drug use, evidence of dose re-
sponse, biological plausibility, and even the seriousness of the 
effect in relation to the treated disease.51 The FDA has indicat-
ed that it may withdraw approval of a drug based on even the 
suspicion of causation shown in post-market research.52  
In Matrixx, the Supreme Court found that Matrixx could 
be liable to its investors for securities fraud stemming from its 
lack of disclosure of reported adverse effects of its over-the-
counter cold remedy, Zicam, even though the incidence of those 
reported effects was not statistically significant.53 In doing so, 
the Court affirmed a decision by the Ninth Circuit—the same 
circuit that decided Harkonen.54  
Reports of adverse effects began to emerge around 1999, 
when a neurologist called Matrixx after discovering a possible 
link between Zicam and anosmia, a loss of smell.55 Other re-
ports began to arrive, and Matrixx’s vice president for research 
 
 48. See Brief for Statistics Experts, supra note 27, at 21 (noting that fac-
tors such as sample size and lack of data may make calculating statistical sig-
nificance “futile”). 
 49. See International Conference on Harmonisation; Guidance on Statisti-
cal Principles for Clinical Trials; Availability, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,583, 49,596 
(Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Harmonisation]. The FDA notes that p-values are 
“sometimes useful” in safety analyses, but an approach that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches is preferred. Id. 
 50. See U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 13 (“Statistical significance is a lim-
ited and non-exclusive tool for inferring causation[.]”).  
 51. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE 
PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT (2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatingInformation/Guidances/UCM126834 
.pdf. 
 52. See FDA, THE CLINICAL IMPACT OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 6–7 
(1996), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/MedWatch/ 
UCM168505.pdf; see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 
1309, 1320 (2011). 
 53. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1317–18. 
 54. Id. at 1314; United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 633 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 55. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314. 
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and development, Timothy Clarot, reached out to at least one 
reporting doctor to discuss the effects.56 During one of these 
phone calls, Clarot was informed about studies from the 1930s 
and 1980s discussing zinc’s57 toxicity and ability to cause anos-
mia.58 Clarot also reached out to prevent a doctor from explicit-
ly mentioning Zicam in a poster presentation to the American 
Rhinologic Society which discussed patients’ resulting anosmia 
after using the drug.59 At least two plaintiffs had sued Matrixx 
for allegedly losing their smell due to Zicam use by the time 
Matrixx made public statements claiming that they expected 
revenues to be up by eighty percent in January 2004.60 This 
was also in spite of Matrixx’s own report to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which described a potential material 
adverse effect which it expected could result in product liability 
claims.61 On January 30, 2004, the FDA was reportedly looking 
into complaints about anosmia resulting from Zicam use.62 
In a public statement responding to this report, Matrixx 
announced that “‘the safety and efficacy of zinc gluconate for 
the treatment of . . . the common cold have been well estab-
lished in two double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clin-
ical trials,’” that neither study had reported any adverse effects 
of anosmia, and that the overall incidence of adverse effects as-
sociated with zinc gluconate was statistically insignificant.63 
Matrixx argued to the Court that the lack of statistical signifi-
cance eliminated its responsibility to disclose adverse effects 
reports to its investors.64 Matrixx’s claim “rest[ed] on the prem-
ise that statistical significance is the only reliable indication of 
causation.”65 The government explicitly opposed this position, 
 
 56. See id. 
 57.  Zicam’s active ingredient, zinc gluconate, used a zinc base. Id. 
 58. See id. at 1314–15. 
 59. Id. at 1315. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Zicam was approved by the FDA for use under its guidelines re-
garding homeopathic treatments. See id. at 1316.  
 63. Id. at 1316 
 64. Id. at 1318–19. The Court noted that such a bright-line rule would ar-
tificially exclude information that a reasonable investor might use in making a 
financial decision. See id. at 1319 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
236 (1988)). 
 65. Id. at 1319 
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noting that experts, such as medical specialists, routinely “con-
sider multiple factors in assessing causation. . . .”66  
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision that a claim of se-
curities fraud against Matrixx could go forward, the Matrixx 
decision noted that there are a number of ways both courts and 
medical experts show causation outside of statistical signifi-
cance.67 The Court held that something more than statistical 
significance in clinical trials must be considered when deciding 
what to disclose to investors, suggesting that the source, con-
tent, and context of adverse reports may be relevant.68 
Harkonen, in his petition for certiorari, claimed that his 
conviction by the Ninth Circuit directly conflicts with the Su-
preme Court and government in the Matrixx decision.69 In a 
way, Harkonen is correct—the government and courts are 
weighting p-values differently by holding statistical signifi-
cance to be conclusive when deciding effectiveness and insuffi-
ciently conclusive when considering safety. Through these deci-
sions, the government is beginning to shape the way statistical 
significance should be used in drug manufacturing, marketing, 
and post-market analysis.  
 
 66. U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 8. Medical researchers, filing an inde-
pendent brief, pointed out that some adverse effects, while undoubtedly linked 
to a drug’s use, might occur so infrequently or with such subtlety that no re-
searcher or manufacturer would likely be able to compile a dataset of appro-
priate quality or quantity. See Brief of Amici Curiae Medical Researchers in 
Support of Respondents Urging Affirmance at 11, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09-1156). 
 67. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1319–20. 
 68. Id. at 1321. The language involving examination of the context of re-
ports bears a strong resemblance to the FDA’s approach to treating 
postmarket reports of adverse effects. Compare Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321, 
with Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596. Prior to the Matrixx decision, a 
number of securities fraud cases with similar claims regarding statistically 
insignificant adverse effects reports had been dismissed. See Joseph B. 
Kadane, Matrixx v. Siracusano: What Do Courts Mean by ‘Statistical 
Significance’?, 11 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 41, 42–44 (2011). While it is not with-
in the scope of this Note to discuss the case history leading up to the Matrixx 
decision, at least one author has come to the conclusion that Matrixx follows 
that line of cases, but comes to a different conclusion only due to the strength 
of the facts presented in the case. Id. at 46. This would indicate that, despite 
previous decisions dismissing cases regarding statistically insignificant ad-
verse facts, the courts have always espoused the idea that statistical signifi-
cance is not the end-all, be-all of showing causation. See id. at 46–47. 
 69. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 26 (“The First 
Amendment does not permit the government to prosecute a scientific view-
point in one courtroom while championing that same viewpoint in another.”). 
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II.  THE FDA TREATS P-VALUES DIFFERENTLY FOR 
DIFFERENT PURPOSES, AND THE FDA’S POLICY CHOICE 
HAS EXTENDED INTO THE COURTS   
While the decisions in Harkonen and Matrixx seem to cast 
light on a conflict which requires the FDA’s attention, this Note 
will demonstrate how the FDA’s policies regarding safety and 
efficacy already support the reasoning inherent in those opin-
ions. Section A describes how the FDA actually values statisti-
cal significance minimally when considering the safety of a 
drug and poses some suggestions as to why this may be. Section 
B contrasts this approach with the high value the FDA places 
on statistical significance in the context of efficacy, and sug-
gests the reasons behind that focus. Section C recognizes that 
the FDA occasionally errs from the standard framework of 
analysis set out in Part II and describes when that deviation 
might occur. 
A. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE WHEN 
CONSIDERING THE SAFETY OF A DRUG 
Statistical significance is less important to the FDA’s anal-
ysis of the safety of a drug than the mere fact that adverse ef-
fects occur after the administration of that drug. While not cod-
ified in regulation, this stance is reflected in the FDA’s 
rampant use of other factors70 and their use of tests that are 
generally frowned upon in proving the effectiveness of a drug.71 
The FDA and courts disregard stringent methods of linking ad-
verse effects to product use because public policy dictates that 
safety be paramount, both in restricting potentially non-
effective drugs and in withdrawing potentially dangerous ones. 
1. Current State of Statistical Significance in Safety Analyses 
The FDA uses a number of factors outside of statistical 
significance to assess the safety of a product, such as temporali-
ty between use and event, consistency across studies, evidence 
of a dose-dependent response, biological plausibility, and seri-
ousness of the side effect relative to the disease being treated, 
among others.72 In analyzing these factors, the FDA approves a 
drug sponsor’s data mining of its studies in order to further 
 
 70. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
 71. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19. 
 72. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.  
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hone the precise nature of the safety risk.73 Such post hoc anal-
yses are generally frowned upon in the drug approval process 
due to risks of manufacturers mining data to achieve a higher 
rate of success for their products.74  
In analyzing marketed drugs’ safety, the FDA may gather 
information not only from manufacturers’ studies, but also 
through its Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS).75 Re-
ports made through FAERS may be submitted by doctors or 
pharmacists, but may also be created by layperson consumers.76 
The FDA “does not require that a causal relationship between a 
product and event be proven.”77 That being said, the FDA has 
noted that “a temporal relationship between medical product 
and adverse event [sic] . . . can make isolated reports conclusive 
as to a product-event association.”78 The FDA uses these 
FAERS reports to prescribe a variety of actions for a safety re-
view of a drug, and, in some cases, may even use these reports 
to remove a product from the market.79 Reported adverse effects 
sometimes form part of the basis of a recommended denial for a 
drug.80 The FDA’s broad and stringent requirements regarding 
FAERS reporting reflects how little it relies on statistical sig-
nificance when considering the post-market safety of a drug, 
 
 73. See id. at 17. The FDA has noted that post hoc surveillance of a drug 
rarely results in a finding of causality between a drug and an adverse effect. 
See FDA, supra note 52, at 7. Despite that statement, such surveillance may 
produce a “prominent degree of suspicion,” which may be considered sufficient 
for a regulatory decision. Id.  
 74. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19 (describing a report sufficient for drug 
approval as being one that yields a consistent conclusion of efficacy without 
using post hoc analyses); see also Malani et al., supra note 17, at 24 (suggest-
ing that drug companies’ data mining results in too many false positives).  
 75. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ 
Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2014). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. FDA, supra note 52, at 7. 
 79. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), supra note 75; see 
also FDA, supra note 52, at 7. 
 80. See, e.g., BASTINGS, supra note 22, at 3. It is interesting to note that 
the FDA Commissioner’s discretion to remove a drug from the marketplace 
over safety concerns does not require that a lack of safety be shown in any 
manufacturer’s study. See Fisher Bros. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 285–86 
(3d Cir. 1995). In practice, recalls are rare, and involuntary recalls even rarer, 
but statistical significance need not take an active role in a recall analysis. See 
21 C.F.R. § 314.620(a) (2014) (describing requirements for a recall, including a 
catchall of “[o]ther evidence [that] demonstrates that the drug product is not 
shown to be safe or effective under its conditions of use”). 
LEWELLEN_4fmt 4/13/2015  10:02 AM 
1554 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1541 
 
and its weak reliance on such was explicitly acknowledged by 
the government in Matrixx.81 
The Matrixx court held that the FDA’s position—that sta-
tistical significance is not dispositive in the relevance of ad-
verse effects of a drug—was convincing and extended the rele-
vance of other factors into the world of securities fraud.82 
Foremost in the Court’s reasoning was that adverse reports 
take many forms and that several factors the FDA considers in 
issuing safety-related decisions were material in investors’ de-
cisions to involve themselves with a drug manufacturer.83 For 
example, the Court noted that reports discussed a plausibly-
causal link between Zicam and anosmia and that “[c]onsumers 
likely would have viewed the risk associated with Zicam . . . as 
substantially outweighing its benefit.”84 This bears a striking 
resemblance to the FDA’s safety consideration involving the 
“seriousness of the event relative to the disease being treat-
ed.”85 The Court also noted that it was important that Matrixx 
had “ignored reports linking Zicam and anosmia and claimed 
that zinc gluconate’s safety was well-established, when it had 
evidence of a biological link between . . . zinc and anosmia.”86 
This, too, resembles the FDA’s consideration of “biologic plausi-
bility.”87 Both the FDA and the courts, then, appear to weigh 
statistical significance similarly and similarly lightly when dis-
cussing a drug’s safety. 
2. The Statistical Realities of Adverse Effects and Public 
Concern for Safety Demand the Low Weight Afforded to 
Statistical Significance by the FDA 
Congress gave the FDA wide berth in authorizing it to re-
ject drugs based on questionable findings of safety.88 Safety and 
public health have long been considered important government 
 
 81. See U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 19 (“[The] FDA does not apply any 
single metric for determining when additional inquiry or action is necessary, 
and it certainly does not insist on ‘statistical significance.’”). 
 82. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313–14 
(2011). 
 83. Id. at 1323. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
 86. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1323. 
 87. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
 88. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(2), (d)(4) (2012) (stating that the Secretary may 
reject a drug if its study fails to affirmatively demonstrate its safety or lacks 
sufficient evidence to show its safety). 
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interests deserving of special treatment under the law.89 Ap-
proving drugs for safe use should be policed just as strictly.  
The most obvious and compelling reason for withdrawing 
drug approval is the occurrence of a life-threatening illness as-
sociated with the drug’s use. In cases involving life-threatening 
side effects, the FDA has not shied away from issuing public 
health advisories based on a low number of complaints.90 In 
many cases, this results in a voluntary withdrawal of the drug 
from the market by its manufacturer.91 
Other than life-threatening illnesses, however, the FDA 
has recognized a myriad of other reasons why a drug might un-
acceptably threaten public health.92 Zicam, the drug in Matrixx, 
provides a prime example: Zicam was a cold remedy that poten-
tially led to anosmia through a side effect of its main ingredi-
ent, which contained zinc.93 That is, it treated a low-danger ill-
ness with a drug that had the potential to cause a severe side 
effect through a well-known biologically-indicated chemical 
process. This does not comport with the FDA’s mission to pro-
tect consumers from unsafe drugs. This balance rapidly chang-
es if Zicam had, for instance, been effective in fighting liver 
cancer. The FDA satisfies its statutory goals by preventing the 
loss of smell to consumers suffering from the common cold. On 
the other hand, preventing consumers from treating their liver 
cancer—even at the cost of their sense of smell—does not go 
towards fulfilling those goals.94  
 
 89. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976) (“Clearly, the 
protection of public health and safety represents an important function of 
state and local governments.”); cf. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage 
Comm’n, 197 U.S. 453, 460 (“The drainage of a city in the interest of its public 
health and welfare is one of the most important purposes for which the police 
power can be exercised.”).  
 90. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on the Voluntary With-
drawal of Raptiva from the U.S. Market (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http:// 
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm149561 
.htm (issuing such an advisory after four patients using Raptiva for psoriasis 
developed multifocal leukoencephalopathy, three of whom died). 
 91. See, e.g., id. 
 92. See, e.g., FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
 93. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 
(2011). 
 94. The FDA’s guidance regarding safety analyses of a drug reflect this 
balance. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Its regulations regarding 
whether or not to issue a recall, however, do not. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (2014). 
This lack seems like it would bias the FDA’s decision towards issuing a recall 
of drugs the intended effects of which are far more beneficial than their side 
effects are harmful, but the FDA’s initial safety determination has a great im-
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None of these reasons absolutely require the introduction 
of statistical significance to the immediate analysis.95 Nor 
should a formal statistical significance showing be required 
when deciding whether a drug is unsafe, as such a requirement 
would take time, potentially allowing more injuries to develop 
from use of the drug. Statistical significance may, however, be 
useful in adjusting the weight of certain factors in the balanc-
ing test the FDA already uses. For example, if the incidence of 
a minor side effect, such as a migraine headache, were associ-
ated with a drug treating a minor illness, such as bronchitis, 
formal testing involving statistical significance analysis may be 
useful to help distinguish two things: a likelihood of causation 
and a more accurate indication of the number of sufferers of the 
side effect. Statistical significance does not, in and of itself, 
prove causation,96 but researchers may reliably draw a strong 
inference of causation from it.97 Even if significance is not 
reached in the study, a more formal study may assist the FDA 
in determining an approximate percentage of consumers who 
would suffer from the side effect, as these statistics are often 
skewed when only considering voluntary FAERS reports.98 In 
these ways, statistical significance testing would assist the 
FDA in determining how much weight to put behind the rela-
tively low-level side effect of a migraine headache. 
Critics have argued that forcing a company to report all 
adverse events to its investors would be harmful to drug com-
panies and, in turn, consumers everywhere.99 It is easy to ex-
trapolate this argument into the FDA regulatory realm by 
claiming that rampant FDA regulation based on non-causative 
reports would be detrimental to both drug companies and con-
sumers. Requiring that drug developers only submit FAERS 
 
pact on the decision as to whether to even consider a recall in the first place. 
See id. § 7.40.  
 95. Presumably, statistical significance has been involved in the empirical 
determination of zinc’s toxicity. However, no independent study with statisti-
cal significance regarding the toxicity of zinc gluconate (Zicam’s active ingre-
dient) was required when the Matrixx court found that doctors’ warnings to 
Matrixx regarding zinc’s toxicity were relevant to Matrixx’s treatment of that 
information. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314.  
 96. See Brief for Statistics Experts, supra note 27, at 19–21. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), supra note 75. 
 99. See generally Brief for the Consumer Healthcare Products Association 
and the Council for Responsible Nutrition as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09-
1156). 
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reports which have statistically significant causative connec-
tions would, however, ultimately harm drug companies and 
consumers more. Such a requirement would force manufactur-
ers to undertake preemptive tests to accurately determine the 
statistical significance of an event, rather than simply flooding 
the FDA with unsubstantiated reported adverse events. Manu-
facturers are already required to submit studies to show the 
safety of their drugs, and the FDA may require studies on indi-
vidual populations.100 While this saves the FDA time and mon-
ey, it forces drug companies to bear that financial burden.101 In 
the case of an unsafe drug, some companies may undergo ex-
pensive testing, only to have their studies show unacceptable 
statistical significance of causation, resulting in regulatory ac-
tion. Even in the case of manufacturers producing safe drugs 
required to perform a targeted safety study, some risk-averse 
manufacturers may decide to stop marketing their drug rather 
than undergo a safety study and run the risk of forced with-
drawal. 
Dismissing the need for statistical significance to withdraw 
a perceived unsafe drug is beneficial to both consumers and 
manufacturers. The FDA currently employs a multifactor test 
that is suitable in balancing concerns of causation and economy 
with consumer safety. This “low bar” to agency regulation re-
garding the approval of drugs over safety concerns is reinforced 
with the FDA’s stringent policies requiring substantial evi-
dence of drug efficacy. 
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN 
DETERMINING EFFICACY 
While statistical significance is largely meaningless for the 
FDA when examining a drug’s safety, it receives heavy scrutiny 
when examining a drug’s efficacy. Such a policy is in keeping 
with the FDA’s goal of protecting consumer’ safety by only al-
lowing effective drugs to find their way into the marketplace. 
 
 100. See FDA, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing how a study may not be appli-
cable to a certain population and would then require further studies targeting 
that population). 
 101. See Charles L. Hooper, Pharmaceuticals: Economics and Regulation, 
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PharmaceuticalsEconomicsandRegulation 
.html (“The path through the FDA’s review process is slow and expensive. The 
ten to fifteen years required to get a drug through the testing and approval 
process leaves little remaining time on a twenty-year patent.”). 
LEWELLEN_4fmt 4/13/2015  10:02 AM 
1558 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1541 
 
1. Current State of Statistical Significance in Efficacy 
Determinations 
Drug applications live and die by their ability to show sta-
tistical significance in their efficacy.102 Drugs that are unable to 
achieve the pre-set p-value of 0.05 that the FDA gives for sta-
tistical significance are generally rejected.103 Furthermore, the 
FDA has set out rigorous testing guidelines and prohibited cer-
tain types of analysis in order to more stringently police which 
drugs may be considered “effective” for their intended uses.104 
The Harkonen court put similar weight into its analysis of 
the relevance of statistical significance to showing causation in 
convicting Harkonen of fraud.105 Harkonen’s claims regarding 
the effectiveness of his drug, Actimmune, came primarily from 
sub-group post hoc analyses.106 The results from these types of 
analyses are “notoriously unreliable” and, in most instances, 
must be independently confirmed by a future trial.107 The 
 
 102. See generally CHEN, supra note 20 (using p-values to support conclu-
sions of differences between treatment groups and results in an approval rec-
ommendation). 
 103. Drugs that purport to benefit a niche population suffering from a seri-
ous illness are notable exceptions to this rule. The FDA has been somewhat 
more flexible in allowing these drugs to come to market due to the lack of op-
tions relevant consumers have in those fields. FDA, PAVING THE WAY FOR 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA’S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT 35 (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PersonalizedMedicine/UCM372421.pdf. This 
has not, however, always been the case, and the FDA has been oft-criticized 
for not being more flexible with its statistical requirements. See, e.g., Jay 
Barnes, Perspective: The Right To Save Your Own Life, NEWS TRIBUNE (June 
8, 2014) http://www.newstribune.com/news/2014/jun/08/perspective-right-save-
your-own-life (“While a stringent FDA approval process makes sense for non-
life- threatening diseases and widespread sale of new drugs, it defies logic to 
forbid Americans who are about to die from taking drugs that might work.”); 
Erica Teichert, FDA Clinical Trials Need More Flexibility, Lawmakers Say, 
LAW360 (July 9, 2014, 2:15 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/555714/ 
fda-clinical-trials-need-more-flexibility-lawmakers-say (indicating that Con-
gress wants the FDA to “allow alternative trial designs and emerging technol-
ogies to gain traction”).  
 104. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that robust results should re-
quire no post hoc analysis). 
 105. See generally United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 
2013). Despite what the petition for certiorari seems to imply, the court did 
not go so far as to say Harkonen definitely failed to establish causation, but 
that his press release was overreaching in its claims of effectiveness. See Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 9–10; see generally Harkonen, 510 
F. App’x 633. 
 106. See Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636. 
 107. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, 
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Harkonen court did not address what level of proof was re-
quired to support Harkonen’s claim that his drug was effective 
for its intended use, but the government argued that the 
study’s only meaningful p-value was for the primary endpoint, 
that the p-value was 0.5, and that such a value meant that “you 
can’t draw any conclusions from this trial.”108 The government’s 
position, then, is clearly spelled out: p-values are essential for 
finding causation in efficacy studies. 
2. The Public Interest of Safety Extends to Efficacy and 
Demands a Strict Standard of Statistical Significance To Show 
Causation 
The history of the FDA as an agency and the legislative 
history of the FDCA both indicate that Congress had the safety 
of consumers in mind when it gave the FDA the power to regu-
late drugs based on their effectiveness.109 Congress recognized 
that no drug is truly safe unless it is also effective in its intend-
ed use.110 Indeed, the opportunity cost of using a drug that pur-
ports to have a certain effect but is not effective would be the 
continuance, and possible worsening, of a disease.  
Requiring a finding of efficacy, then, is similar to requiring 
relatively low levels of severity of side effects for a drug. Unlike 
in safety findings, however, there are few ways of inferring 
causation for efficacy outside of controlled studies.111 One pro-
posed method was to allow anecdotal evidence from physicians 
who regularly prescribed the drugs in question, but the hear-
ings underlying the 1962 amendments to the FDCA marked a 
concern that impressions of physicians are “treacherous.”112 
 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010). Further damning for Harkonen, in the court’s 
eyes, was that he stated he would “‘cut that data and slice it until [he] got the 
kind of results [he was] looking for.’” Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636. The abil-
ity to “cut and slice” like this via post hoc analyses is exactly the kind of data 
manipulation the FDA seeks to avoid by prohibiting such data mining. 
 108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 9. The Harkonen 
court declined to opine on this reasoning, presumably to avoid giving 
Harkonen any argument in its petition, which relies partly on McAnnulty to 
say that the court should not convict someone of fraud who communicates sci-
entifically debatable facts. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 
10. See generally Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633. 
 109. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Janssen, supra note 10. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 75–81. The reporting system is not 
used for pre-market approval of drugs. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting Sys-
tem (FAERS), supra note 75. 
 112. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 619 (1973). 
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Thus, anecdotal evidence, such as the FAERS reports in the 
context of safety, cannot carry significant weight in an efficacy 
analysis. This stance makes sense, as it creates perverse goals 
for manufacturers to incentivize physicians and consumers to 
report their positive results from using a drug.113  
Other factors the FDA relies upon for safety analyses114 al-
so make little sense in the efficacy context. For instance, biolog-
ic plausibility is generally assumed, given the manufacturer re-
searched and designed a drug to meet demand for a particular 
disease.115 Evidence of a dose response is largely irrelevant, un-
til the drug has the effect it purports to have.116 Statistical sig-
nificance tests have built-in endpoints, allowing such studies to 
effectively infer causation for claimed effects.117 
For a finding of “efficacy,” both a useful effect and a strong 
inference of causation must be established.118 These tests cost 
manufacturers—and thus, consumers—money, and prevent 
useful drugs from coming to the market quickly,119 but attempt 
 
 113. Sometimes, the FDA does take consumers’ reports of effectiveness into 
account when deciding whether to roll back a full recall for a select group of 
consumers, but such an action is rare and is accompanied by further testing. 
See, e.g., Letter Regarding Lotronex from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research (Dec. 18, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm110883.htm.  
 114. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 115. Two likely exceptions come to mind. One is where a drug is developed 
for one use, such as pain relief, but frequently used for another use, such as 
lowering blood pressure (e.g., aspirin). In this situation, known as “off-label” 
use, a drug company must go through an additional round of testing for the 
new intended use if it wishes to market the drug in the new way. See “Off-
Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical De-
vices – Information Sheet, FDA (June 25, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm. Another situation in 
which the manufacturer may not know of a biologically plausible mechanism 
by which the drug functions is that in which the drug has been fraudulently 
developed without adequate scientific research and is actually ineffective. In 
both of these situations, the well-controlled testing requirements set by the 
FDA prevents a drug whose biological plausibility is in doubt from release 
without further testing. 
 116. For instance, it is certainly possible for a drug to have an effect that is 
“clinically insignificant.” See Cravens, supra note 24, at 593 n.179. A drug’s 
dosage response may show some causation, but that causation is irrelevant 
until it has a meaningful effect. Id. 
 117. See Ronald A. Thisted, What Is a P-Value? 5–6 (June 8, 1998) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://galton.uchicago.edu/~thisted/ 
Distribute/pvalue.pdf. 
 118. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Hooper, supra note 101 (discussing how the FDA’s evidentiary re-
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to ensure consumers’ safety. The FDA currently requires a p-
value of 0.05 for efficacy studies of new drugs.120 That value is 
something of a “magical standard” that attempts to balance 
consumers’ interests in prohibiting drugs that cannot pass a 
safe threshold with the reality that absolute causation is im-
possible to prove without achieving an unrealistic p-value of ze-
ro.121  
C. THE EFFICIENCY OF A QUICK DRUG APPROVAL IS SOMETIMES 
MORE IMPORTANT THAN ESTABLISHING A STRONG INFERENCE OF 
CAUSATION  
One of the factors that the FDA takes into account when 
assessing the safety of a drug is the “degree of benefit the prod-
uct provides, including availability of other therapies.”122 When 
other therapies are unavailable, statistical significance testing 
may not be as crucial in the approval of a drug. For example, in 
the case of a drug which purports to cure a life-threatening dis-
ease for which there is no other treatment, a study reporting a 
p-value of 0.06, above the limit set by the FDA, should not be 
fatal to the drug’s approval. In this case, the possibility that the 
drug would help the affected population outweighs the possibil-
ity that it might have no effect, as the alternative is that the af-
fected population would have no treatment whatsoever. 
Allowing such drugs to go to market without any statistical 
significance testing should, however, remain forbidden. Such a 
policy would incentivize “gold rushes” to niche markets for drug 
manufacturers, as the second-place manufacturers would be 
required to undergo testing while the first drug was marketed. 
This policy has obvious perverse incentives, including the re-
lease of a fraudulent drug that purports to have an effect with 
no reliable documentation of such an effect. Even for individu-
als with no other hopeful drugs, profiteering off of a miserable 
man’s vain hopes of treatment is morally abhorrent and should 
be prohibited if there is no reason to believe a drug would have 
any effect. Furthermore, dropping any and all significance test-
ing requirement would force ill consumers to do extensive re-
 
quirements for new drug approvals may take a sponsor a decade to achieve 
and cost waiting consumers their lives). 
 120. In re Nuvelo, Inc. Secs. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98441, at *35 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2008). 
 121. Cf. id. at 35–36 (discussing how this value is allowed for two studies 
on the same drug, but how a lower p-value is required for a single study be-
cause of the lack of repetition in testing).  
 122. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
LEWELLEN_4fmt 4/13/2015  10:02 AM 
1562 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1541 
 
search in a flood of near-useless drugs to find the least-useless 
one—an expenditure of time, money, and opportunity of which 
a terminally ill patient has little.123 
Requiring p-value testing at all slows the marketing ap-
proval process, though removing it completely would be unac-
ceptable. Allowing higher p-values in single studies would aid 
in the speed with which a drug might be released while keeping 
some standards by which the FDA could judge the efficacy of a 
drug. 
III.  POLICY CONCERNS DICTATE THAT P-VALUES 
SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT 
CONTEXTS   
This Note has discussed the conflict that seems to arise 
from the opinions in Harkonen and Matrixx. It next analyzed 
the policy decisions that the FDA makes regarding safety and 
efficacy with regards to statistical significance. Next, in Section 
A, this Note compares the reasoning in Harkonnen and Matrixx 
with the policy decisions the FDA has made regarding statisti-
cal significance and concludes that the courts have essentially 
adopted the FDA’s reasoning, although couched in other argu-
ments. Thus, while arguments rage over whether the Matrixx 
court or the Harkonnen court got it right,124 such arguments are 
misplaced because the courts are in accordance. In Section B, 
this Note forwards one field—personalized medicine—as one in 
which the FDA should explicitly discuss its policies regarding 
p-values and safety and efficacy. In Section C, this Note dis-
cusses the methods by which the FDA might promulgate its 
stance and the dangers in taking such a stance. The Note con-
cludes in Section D by offering courts presumptions to hold in 
cases similar to those of Harkonen and Matrixx that focus on 
protecting public safety. 
 
 123. See Kathleen Doheny, Fake Malaria Drugs Thwart Global Efforts To 
Treat Dangerous Diseases, TAKEPART (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.takepart 
.com/article/2012/09/25/counterfeit-medications-thwart-global-efforts-treat 
-dangerous-diseases (discussing how fake drugs with no testing requirements 
may contain some useful, active ingredients but ultimately harm consumers). 
 124. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 1–2; see also Na-
than A. Schachtman, The Matrixx Motion in U.S. v. Harkonen (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://schachtmanlaw.com/the-matrixx-motion-in-u-s-v-harkonen. 
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A. MATRIXX AND HARKONEN STAND FOR TWO SIDES OF THE 
SAME COIN 
The issue in Matrixx was whether or not Matrixx had 
made statements that were misleading as to material facts.125 
The Supreme Court in Matrixx first considered the merits of 
Matrixx’s contention that “adverse event reports that do not re-
veal a statistically significant increased risk of adverse effects 
from product use are not material information.”126 Relying on 
experts’ opinions, including the FDA’s, the Court focused on the 
broad nature of information the FDA considers relevant and 
the lower standards with which the FDA treats causality and 
statistical significance in post-market surveillance.127 The Court 
stopped short of requiring that all adverse events reported to a 
company be disclosed to investors,128 but noted that the type of 
information that Matrixx received should have tipped it off to a 
change in the “total mix” of information provided to it.129 
The Matrixx Court found that this “total mix” was shifted 
because of reports from “more than 10” patients who had lost 
their smell from three medical professionals and researchers 
and due to Matrixx’s knowledge of a presentation made at a 
medical conference about a potential causal link between Zicam 
and anosmia.130 The Court noted that that presentation includ-
ed a case study which suggested “a temporal relationship be-
tween Zicam use and anosmia.”131 
The Matrixx Court relied heavily on the criteria that the 
FDA uses in conjunction with the FAERS system to investigate 
potentially harmful drugs. The Court, as well as the FDA, 
looked to the number of similar complaints of the same side ef-
fects (i.e., consistency across reports) as well as other numerous 
factors, including the temporality of the drug use and implicat-
ed side effects.132 
 
 125. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011). 
 126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. See id. at 1320. 
 128. See id. at 1321. 
 129. Id. at 1322. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. These criteria cited by the court are similar to those given by the FDA 
as considerations when looking at the safety of a drug. See FDA, supra note 51 
at 6–7. 
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The court in Harkonen focused on the materiality of evi-
dence regarding not safety and side effects, but efficacy.133 The 
court found against Harkonen based mainly on his knowledge 
of the likelihood of his drug’s rejection, his willingness to ma-
nipulate data to get the results he wanted, and InterMune’s bi-
ostatistics expert’s testimony that the company overstated the 
conclusiveness of the results.134 While the court did not explicit-
ly rely on the FDA’s statistical significance standards for drug 
approval regarding efficacy, it was swayed by Harkonen’s be-
havior, especially when he said that he wanted to take the data 
from the drug study and cut and slice it until he got the results 
(the p-value) he was looking for.135 The FDA’s requirement for 
statistical significance seems to have been the driving factor for 
Harkonen’s behavior. 
Because this was a jury trial, we may never know what the 
tipping point of the testimony was, but it is clear from the rec-
ord that the jury heard testimony from Intermune’s researchers 
stating that “[t]he indices didn’t show any difference whatsoev-
er, and the p-values were very high showing no evidence what-
soever.”136 That researcher also informed Harkonen that they 
“had no evidence of an effect on the primary efficacy end-
point.”137 The researcher suggested further tests to follow up on 
a post hoc analysis that showed possible survival benefits.138 
Thus, some evidence (i.e., post hoc analysis) existed to show the 
glimmer of some benefits. The FDA, however, does not support 
the use of post hoc analysis in efficacy testing, as it is inherent-
ly unreliable.139 When Harkonen represented this glimmer of 
success in survival benefits as being supported by data, then, 
the jury found him guilty of fraud.140 This strict reliance on reli-
able statistical significance by the jury, upheld by the Ninth 
Circuit, mirrors the FDA’s approach to efficacy and statistical 
significance. 
Harkonen and Matrixx both represent the FDA’s and our 
society’s views that, as matters of public policy, efficacy should 
 
 133. See United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 636–37 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 134. Id. at 637–38. 
 135. Id. at 636. 
 136. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010).    
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19. 
 140. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636–37. 
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be held to a stricter standard to show causality (requiring sta-
tistical significance), while a showing of a product’s danger 
(imputing its safety) may be satisfied with far less evidence. 
These decisions reflect the view that the safety of a consumer is 
paramount in drug transactions. The cases are not at odds, but 
rather are pointing to the same conclusion: companies face a 
high burden when bringing drugs to market, as there is a pre-
sumption of inefficacy in place to protect consumers; and com-
panies face a high burden once deleterious effects have been 
linked to their product, as there is a presumption of causation 
that companies must disprove. The Supreme Court seems to 
agree that no further interpretation is needed, as Harkonen’s 
petition for certiorari was recently denied.141 
With that in mind, both the FDA and society at large rec-
ognize times when these standards should be bent. As dis-
cussed above, for instance, the FDA has recognized that con-
sumer demand for potentially unsafe, potentially ineffective 
drugs may be justified in situations where there is no other 
hope.142 What about other scenarios when, for example, statisti-
cal significance testing may be next to impossible, or post hoc 
analysis is the only kind of analysis available? 
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE WEIGHTED LIGHTLY 
IN THE APPROVAL OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 
Personalized medicine is an up-and-coming field of treat-
ment in which drugs are narrowly tailored to specific popula-
tions, or even individuals.143 For example, one drug might aim 
at reducing blood pressure in only African-American diabetic 
patients because it targets a specific characteristic unique to 
that population. The ultimate aim of personalized medicine is 
to create treatment plans unique to an individual, tailoring a 
drug and its dosage not just to the disease, but to the disease 
and patient.144 
The problem with requiring a showing of statistical signifi-
cance for approval in such scenarios lies in the target popula-
tions’ small sample sizes. The FDA has warned that tests with 
small sample sizes often lack the power to show significant clin-
ical effect.145 As treatments shift to the individual level, it be-
 
 141. Harkonen v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013) (mem.).  
 142. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 143. See FDA, supra note 103, at 2. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 34. 
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comes impossible for drug companies to design studies that 
may predict effectiveness in a patient—instead of extrapolating 
those effects from other studies—without testing each individ-
ual.146  
Individualized medicine, then, marks a boundary at which 
statistical significance is no longer useful in the way that the 
FDA currently uses it to approve drugs.147 For the purposes of 
individualized medicine, post hoc analyses currently not al-
lowed in approval of drugs may be useful in approving person-
alized drugs, simply because there is little to no other option to 
establish statistical significance.  
While post hoc analyses are in danger of abuse by manu-
facturers, this policy concern is greatly lessened in the sphere 
of personalized medicine because of the great differential in po-
tential profits a company may recoup from a personalized med-
icine approval.148 For example, a late-stage pancreatic cancer 
medicine that is found to be ineffective to the population at 
large but is found to be effective in a post hoc analysis for 0.5 
percent of the population which carries a certain recessive ge-
netic trait should probably be approved for that sub-group. The 
manufacturer’s incentive to manipulate the data may still be 
present, but the reward, being much smaller, makes doing so 
less tempting. That analysis, when considered with other fac-
tors like the availability of other effective medicine and the se-
verity of the illness, should take priority in approving individu-
alized medicine.  
C. GUIDANCE: ADVANTAGES AND PITFALLS 
Issuing a guidance document to delineate the purpose of p-
values may, at first, seem like an attractive proposition. The 
FDA regularly issues guidance documents to aid drug and de-
vice developers in conforming to the FDA’s requirements.149 In 
such documents, however, the FDA has been careful not to deal 
in absolutes when discussing the use of p-values in determining 
 
 146. Id. at 30. 
 147. The approval process generally is not particularly useful for personal-
ized medicine, which, by its nature, produces drugs that require approval only 
once an individual requires them; a near-record time for approval is roughly 
3.6 months. Id. at 35. Despite that, it is clear that some sort of approval pro-
cess is still necessary. See Doheny, supra note 123. 
 148. Cf. FDA, supra note 103, at 2 (discussing how personalized medicine 
markets to a small population or to an individual).  
 149. See generally Clinical Trials Guidance Documents, FDA (Dec. 24, 
2014), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm122046.htm. 
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drug safety150 and efficacy.151 This inclusive approach comports 
with its stance on safety, but seems to run afoul of its seeming-
ly religious adhesion to statistical significance in showing effi-
cacy. Instead of providing bright-line rules for the use of p-
values in efficacy, which would doubtlessly be useful for the ef-
ficiency of the drug approval system, the FDA has historically 
elected to be flexible in its approach.152 
1. Safety Above All Else 
The FDA has openly stated that p-values may sometimes 
be valueless in the determination of a drug’s safety: in its guid-
ance on statistical principles, the Agency determined that p-
values may oftentimes be considerably imprecise when dealing 
with low-frequency occurrences, such as in the context of side 
effects.153 At the same time, the FDA states that p-values can be 
useful in evaluating safety claims, particularly with large 
amounts of laboratory data.154  
What the Agency’s guidance does not state is as important 
as what it does. For example, while the guidance discusses how 
to treat p-values—useful or useless, depending on the situa-
tion—it does not discuss all the methods of identifying safety 
problems with a developing drug, though it does try to provide 
helpful hints to researchers seeking to construct an informative 
trial.155 This all-inclusive approach in its guidance is consistent 
with the FDA’s overall approach to safety.  
2. Efficacy and Flexibility 
On the other hand, the lack of firm guidance with regards 
to statistical significance and efficacy is, at first, more difficult 
to explain. While the FDA normally requires two “adequate and 
well-controlled individual trials,”156 it has noted a number of ex-
ceptions that may allow a single drug study to support an effec-
 
 150. See Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596. 
 151. Cf. FDA supra note 5, at 15 (noting that while a “statistically very 
persuasive finding” may be enough to allow for a single trial, rather than the 
standard double trial, such findings have occasionally been shown to be false 
positives). 
 152. See id. at 3 (“[The] FDA has been flexible within the limits imposed by 
the congressional scheme, broadly interpreting the statutory requirements to 
the extent possible where the data on a particular drug were convincing.”). 
 153. See Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 49,595–96. 
 156. Id. 
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tiveness claim.157 While one of these exceptions is a particularly 
persuasive p-value, it is crucial to note that the “Agency has 
not comprehensively described the situations in which a single 
adequate and well-controlled study might be considered ade-
quate support for an effectiveness claim,” and that not all of the 
exceptions include a persuasive p-value.158 The FDA recognizes 
that, while statistical significance is an exceptionally useful ar-
gument for a drug’s efficacy in a single trial, rather than a dou-
ble, it need not be a necessity in a drug’s approval. Statistical 
significance remains, for the most part, a de facto requirement, 
even if not de jure.159 
As discussed above, the FDA has already begun to enunci-
ate flexible standards with regards to personalized medicine.160 
The FDA’s firm practical stance on requiring statistical signifi-
cance for drug testing has been effective in screening potential-
ly ineffective drugs from the market, but its loose guidelines 
have allowed it to react dynamically to advancements of science 
and the dawn of the age of personalized medicine. Calcifying 
the Agency’s official stance on p-values with regards to efficacy 
may stifle further scientific development. 
D. JUDICIAL TAKEAWAY AND PRESUMPTIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE 
Courts should be encouraged to look at the public policy 
behind the FDA’s decisions to treat statistical significance as it 
does—nearly a necessity in the realm of efficacy, barring some 
extraordinary circumstances; and as useful, but not dispositive 
in the realm of safety. Clear guidance from the FDA regarding 
statistical significance and claims of a drug’s efficacy is not 
available, nor will it likely be forthcoming due to concerns over 
the FDA’s flexibility in dealing with future drug development 
advances. Guidance from the FDA regarding which factors, in-
cluding p-values, may be dispositive in showing a safety con-
cern will necessarily be vague so as to allow flexibility in find-
ing flaws in treatments through a variety of pathways. 
Through its decisions and guidance regarding statistical signif-
icance in clinical drug trials, however, the FDA has focused on 
a central public policy goal that courts ought to notice: safety of 
drugs is paramount. 
 
 157. FDA, supra note 5, at 13–15. 
 158. Id. at 12. 
 159. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 103; Part III.B. 
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As such, the courts should favor public safety by adopting 
presumptions against the safety and efficacy of drugs. If a 
drug’s efficacy is challenged, it should face the high bar of sta-
tistical significance currently—if not explicitly—adopted in 
FDA policy. If a drug’s safety is challenged, it should face a 
similarly high bar of disproving the allegations of harm, or else 
be forced to disclose those allegations. These presumptions fa-
voring public safety are inherent in the conclusions drawn by 
the Matrixx and Harkonen courts and should be used expan-
sively, especially now that the Supreme Court has declined to 
comment on the supposed “discord.” Some exceptions will cer-
tainly arise, such as in the case of personalized medicine, where 
stringent bars regarding statistical significance may be nigh 
impossible to overcome. In such cases, courts should look to 
balance consumers’ concerns, such as the lack of alternative 
treatments for their illnesses, against the threat to their safety, 
and lower the requisite causative bar accordingly. 
Developers of drugs like Actimmune should not be allowed 
to tell their investors that the drug is effective if the undoctored 
p-value shows a lack of statistical significance. A lack of statis-
tical significance indicates a lack of efficacy and, thus, an un-
safe investment of time and effort for both the investor and the 
consumer. Developers of drugs like Zicam should not be allowed 
to leave objectively credible reports that their drug is harming 
their consumers unreported, even if those events constitute low 
statistical significance, because a sure showing of causation is 
of secondary concern in a situation where consumers are being 
harmed. An analysis similar to that which the FDA undertakes 
for safety concerns161 or for efficacy162 is appropriate in the pres-
ence of extraordinary factors. Such analyses should be relative-
ly simple for courts to perform in cases replete with experts in 
statistics and drug development. 
  CONCLUSION   
The courts in Matrixx and Harkonen treated statistical 
significance differently because of the different contexts in 
which each was presented: Matrixx presented an issue of safety 
and Harkonen one of efficacy. The FDA treats statistical signif-
icance with similar context-sensitivity, though it does so implic-
itly. In the context of safety, statistical significance is relatively 
 
 161. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18. 
 162. See supra Part II.B. 
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unimportant to the goal of preventing dangerous drugs from 
entering and remaining on the market, as adverse effects 
caused by the drug may often manifest at statistically-
insignificant but extremely personally-significant levels. In the 
context of efficacy, statistical significance is of utmost im-
portance because it provides a barrier over which only proba-
bly-effective drugs are allowed; stringent statistical cutoffs are 
required to fulfill the goal of safety and reduce opportunity 
costs for consumers.  
Although statistical significance may play a role in any ap-
proval, the FDA uses a flexible approval process for the bur-
geoning field of personalized medicine, where large sample siz-
es—and, thus, reliable tests for statistical significance—are 
impossible. The Agency instead allows responsible post hoc da-
ta analysis to serve as acceptable showings of statistical signifi-
cance for drugs. Courts should follow the FDA’s lead in showing 
flexibility in determining the importance of statistical signifi-
cance where a showing of such would be impossible. In apply-
ing any balancing test, however, courts should keep in mind 
that public safety is, and should be, the government’s primary 
concern in regulating drugs. 
